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Nancy Gallagher
The security circumstances confronting the world today are fundamentally different
from those which shaped the theory and practice of Cold War arms control. Then,
the central problem was to deter a massive nuclear or conventional attack while
using arms control to stabilise deterrence and prevent proliferation. Now, the United
States and its allies have little reason to fear a deliberate large-scale attack. Instead,
the most troublesome security problems involve smaller-scale, more diffuse dangers
driven by key trends associated with globalisation.1 Various developments, including
the information revolution, the emergence of global markets and transnational
networks, widespread access to dual-use materials and sophisticated technologies,
and growing economic inequalities, have magnified the threats posed by angry
individuals, disaffected groups and weak states. They have also multiplied the
destruction that could occur from natural causes, accident, inadvertence or other
unintended consequences of ‘business as usual’ in a tightly connected high-tech-
nology world.
The Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the University of
Maryland is exploring conceptual issues and operational techniques for co-operative
responses to new global security problems.2 The goal is to promote interdisciplinary
research and discussion about applications that exemplify emerging security problems
and embody elements of potential solutions. The current focus is on research with
dangerous pathogens, space activities and fissile material controls. This chapter
presents the basic concept of advanced co-operative security and explores the role
for verification in advanced co-operative security systems. It also provides a brief
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These concepts are at an early stage of development and far removed from current
practice. This essay seeks to spark further research and discussion in order to broaden
the array of options available for serious consideration.
The challenges of global security
The central problem for global security today is not balancing competing alliance
systems but building inclusive arrangements which let co-operative states and
non-state actors pursue diverse interests without causing major unintended problems
and which organise the vast majority of willing co-operators to deal more effectively
with a relatively small number of hostile players. This involves a reduced emphasis
on deterrence and contingency response, and an increased emphasis on reassurance
and systematic prevention. In the nuclear arena, for example, numbers now matter
less than operational practices. Any country’s residual need for deterrence can
be satisfied with a much smaller stockpile of weapons. The most worrying scenarios
all involve some type of irresponsible behaviour, such as lax security at storage
sites, or loose talk about ‘usable’ nuclear weapons that promotes proliferation
and weakens the nuclear taboo. Reducing such nuclear dangers requires agreement
on operational practices that minimise the potential for misperception, mistakes,
uncontrollable escalation or opportunistic action by hostile third parties.
The incentives for a reorientation of security policy from deterrence and secrecy
towards reassurance and transparency were evident by the mid-1980s, when the 35
members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe () sought
to reduce risk of conventional war by changing European security concepts and
operational practices. The 1986 Stockholm Accord provided for modest information
exchanges, on-site inspections and constraints on major military activities. The
1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe () Treaty and the associated agree-
ment on personnel (the 1992 -1 Agreement), as well as the series of Vienna
Documents (1990, 1992, 1994 and 1999) that followed the Stockholm Accord and
the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, have included tighter behavioural constraints, detailed
data-reporting requirements, extensive verification mechanisms and institutional
arrangements which are integral to a more co-operative European security system.3
Initial attempts to elaborate the concept of co-operative security reflected this
dramatic shift in East–West security relations. The original approach focused on





setting agreed standards for the size, concentration, configuration and operations
of national militaries. The goal was to permit defence of the homeland but preclude
large-scale external attacks, and to facilitate effective and legitimate multilateral
military responses to external aggression or civil conflict. Compliance was to be
verified through extensive transparency around weapons and operations, including
increased sharing of national intelligence and international technical monitoring.
Some inspection of key defence programmes was also considered necessary. Propo-
nents argued that co-operative security systems should be inclusive and equitable,
and should rely when possible on positive inducements and other forms of co-
operative compliance management. They recognised, however, that a comprehensive
co-operative security system would need tougher enforcement mechanisms, inclu-
ding economic sanctions and multilateral military responses.4
The example that comes closest to co-operative security from outside the European
conventional force context is probably the nuclear threat reduction programmes
in the former Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, changed security circumstances and
altered threat perceptions convinced the American and Russian leaders that they
had a mutual interest in ensuring the safe and secure handling of nuclear weapons
and material from the former Soviet arsenal. A variety of American-funded projects
have helped Russia eliminate nuclear launchers under the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty ( ); removed nuclear weapons from other former Soviet states; and
reduced the likelihood that nuclear weapons, material or know-how would prolif-
erate to hostile states or terrorist groups.
These programmes have improved Russian security standards and practices. New
monitoring technologies are being developed to demonstrate that co-operative
obligations have been met, without revealing other sensitive information. By develop-
ing industrial partnerships with Russian entities, American government agencies
and firms have learned about Russian nuclear operations and gained experience
working on nuclear problems with their Russian counterparts. However, despite
these practical benefits, deeper co-operation has been impeded by suspicions and
resistance on both sides. American access to sensitive Russian sites is restricted;
Russia does not gain reciprocal access and auditing rights that come as a condition
of American funding; and individual co-operative projects have not been embedded
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ad hoc threat reduction co-operation may be a step in the right direction, but it
falls far short of comprehensive co-operative security.5
Meanwhile global trends are generating new types of security problem that cannot
be addressed effectively through unilateral action, traditional arms control or ad
hoc co-operation. For example, biotechnology has the potential to cure life-threat-
ening illnesses or to create more virulent pathogens which could cause devastation
that would rival the results of nuclear attack and against which defence would be
equally difficult. Research involving especially dangerous pathogens, such as smallpox
and Ebola, cannot be banned without foreclosing opportunities for protection
and forgoing other public health benefits. Export controls, access controls and the
classification of weapons-related information cannot provide reliable protection
because everything needed to make deadly diseases is available in nature, in world-
wide scientific laboratories and pharmaceutical firms, from mail-order companies,
or on the Internet. Since large amounts of bio-agents could be grown quickly
from a small sample of a virulent organism, quantitative limits are not an effective
way to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate activities. In short, the national
security and arms control tools that have helped to prevent nuclear proliferation
are not well suited for preventing the misuse of biology without impeding benefi-
cial research.
Addressing such security challenges requires the development of more advanced
co-operative security concepts and practices. They would have much in common
with their predecessors, including the basic premise that most states and non-
state actors do not want to threaten others’ security and would benefit from shared
standards of behaviour and mechanisms of reassurance; but the concept of advanced
co-operative security differs from its predecessors in ways that reflect key trends in
global security. Potential threats no longer arise primarily from dangerous config-
urations of military capabilities, but increasingly from the misapplication of
dual-use technologies that are dispersed throughout society. Thus, advanced co-
operative security arrangements cannot be mainly between national military estab-
lishments but must include scientists, commercial interests and non-governmental
organisations.
If massive aggression is now less likely than asymmetrical attacks or dispersed
interactions that coalesce into catastrophe, then the dividing line between legitimate





and illegitimate activities can no longer turn on quantitative thresholds or qualitative
distinctions, such as rules about how large a purely defensive military can be and
what types of weaponry it should or should not have. Instead, striking the right
balance between promoting the beneficial uses of potentially dangerous technology
while preventing misapplications will require expert judgements based on detailed
information about who is doing what, why and how. This means that compliance
cannot be verified primarily through exchanges of national intelligence, remote
sensing, passive on-site monitoring or adversarial inspections. It will require unprece-
dented sharing of sensitive information, sophisticated systems for handling large
volumes of data, and extensive protection against the misuse of information that
was disclosed for protective purposes.
The role for verification in advanced co-operative security
Verification—one of the most controversial and time-consuming aspects of Cold
War arms control—has been attacked from both the political left and the political
right as largely unnecessary and often counterproductive in the new, more co-opera-
tive security environment. The administration of President George W. Bush in the
 appropriated a stance that had long been popular with the disarmament move-
ment by declaring that a strategic arms agreement could be reached quickly, without
lengthy negotiation of detailed verification provisions, because verification would
only institutionalise mistrust. As for agreements that include not only rivals-turned-
friends but also countries of concern, some people are using the changed nature of
the threat as evidence that verification could diminish national security and prosper-
ity. For example, the Bush administration withdrew  support for the negotiation
of a verification protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
() on the grounds that the types of multilateral transparency measure that were
under consideration could not reliably detect clandestine work with small amounts
of deadly pathogens, yet would reveal information about  national security and
commercial activities that could aid potential attackers or business competitors.
These attempts to dismiss verification as an outmoded relic of the Cold War are
based on a narrow, often politically motivated, conception of verification as an
adversarial process that should provide nearly complete confidence that every
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attributed in time for a response before national security is harmed.6 This conception
neither reflects the full range of past verification approaches and accomplishments
nor illuminates the role that verification should play in advanced co-operative security
systems.
Verification, broadly defined, refers to any process that is used to assess compliance
with co-operative obligations. It can be implicit and purely unilateral, as was the
case with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (also known as the Partial Test Ban
Treaty, the ) which does not mention verification because the superpowers’
own monitoring systems would provide evidence of a nuclear test in a prohibited
environment. It can be part of an adversarial ‘game’ with monitoring rules and
inspection rights in which opponents try to uncover information about the other
side’s treaty compliance and ‘collateral issues’ while protecting their own sensitive
information, as was largely the case with superpower nuclear arms control. It can
also take more co-operative forms, as with the European conventional security
agreements mentioned above or the safeguard agreements used to confirm that
non-nuclear weapon state parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
() are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses into weapon programmes.
The reasons for pursuing verification can also be diverse. States can press for intru-
sive and exacting verification arrangements in order to gain high confidence in
compliance or to stymie negotiations. Likewise, they can favour only modest
measures, such as voluntary data exchanges, because they care more about reaching
an agreement than they do about compliance; because they want to protect their
own secrets more than they care to know what others are doing; or because they
have no real interest in agreements that constrain their own military options.
The trends shaping global security have reduced the importance of some of the
factors that made verification important and controversial during the Cold War.
At the same time, they have intensified other factors that make the exchange and
analysis of compliance information likely to be even more essential and contentious
than it was before, regardless of whether the process is called verification or something
else. Despite recurrent American attempts to depict verification as a technical
adjunct to the substantive limits placed on the superpowers’ military capabilities,
both sides in the Cold War recognised that information revealed, obtained or
concealed during the verification process had intrinsic national security value.





Cold War concerns about verification could be somewhat muted, however, because
the co-operative constraints left each side with such large residual capabilities that
low-level cheating or collateral information collection was unlikely to have a signi-
ficant effect on the bilateral strategic balance.
Addressing the most pressing global security problems will require more compre-
hensive and reliable obligations and verification arrangements among a diverse
group of states and non-state actors. The stakes will be as high as they were during
the Cold War, but it will be harder to tolerate sloppiness in any part of a security
system. No amount of residual military capability can compensate for problems
such as major intelligence failures, lax safety practices in work with dangerous
pathogens, imprecise accounting standards that lose track of fissile material, or
enforcement systems that can only handle egregious violations.
Given the ease with which dangers can cross national borders, homeland security
will require not only tougher domestic regulatory arrangements but also high
standards and rates of compliance among global neighbours. The complexity of
the issues, the diversity of interests, the high stakes and low tolerance for mistakes
mean that formal legal agreements with clear obligations, accountability measures
and methods of protection will be necessary at both the national and the international
levels. Everyone will want to know that the overall system is working as intended,
but in the information age the adage that ‘knowledge is power’ is truer than ever.
Thus, it is crucial to think carefully about what compliance information is really
necessary, how it should be gathered, who should have access to raw data and analy-
sis, and how assessments of compliance should be made.
The shift in emphasis of co-operative security from deterrence and contingency
response to reassurance and systematic prevention calls for a corresponding reorien-
tation in the ends and means of verification. If in a co-operative security regime
one is less concerned about deliberate aggression by any of the main players and
more concerned either that they might engage in inadvertently dangerous behaviour
or that a minor player (small state or terrorist group) might misbehave, then more
emphasis can be placed on reassurance than was true of traditional American appro-
aches to verification. The deterrence and detection functions do not disappear, but
the normal mode of verification can assume that most participants will try to
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the rules, not because they fear punishment. Verification is no longer seen as a zero-
sum game between hiders and finders. Instead, the presumption is that most
participants will be willing to exchange detailed information in the interests of
mutual reassurance and protection so long as they have confidence that the inform-
ation will be handled carefully and used appropriately. With reassurance as the
primary objective, it makes no sense to differentiate between ‘substantive’ obligations
and verification mechanisms because disclosure is an integral and intrinsically
valuable part of an advanced co-operative security system.
Reconceptualising verification to emphasise the co-operative exchange of inform-
ation for mutual benefit can increase international support for a robust cooperative
security system. During the Cold War, representatives of the non-aligned countries
often dismissed the superpowers’ use of mutually incompatible, but equally adver-
sarial, approaches to verification as evidence that neither side was really serious
about co-operation. In more recent multilateral negotiations, verification has some-
times been seen as a Western construct to which developing countries might
acquiesce in return for other forms of technical, scientific or financial assistance,
not as something that directly increases the security of all participants.7 But if
verification information is used not just to catch the ‘bad guys’ but also to help
the ‘good guys’ benefit safely from dual-use technologies, then verification is less
likely to be seen as a Western obsession that offers little but trouble for the rest of
the world.
Broadening the objectives of verification to include positive purposes beyond
reassurance can be controversial. When information from a verification system is
also used to accomplish some unrelated, but unquestionably benign, objective, as
occurs with earthquake data from the seismic sensors for the 1996 Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (), the only real concern is that the secondary purpose
might detract attention and resources from the primary mission. The situation
is more problematic when the same information could be used for co-operative
or competitive purposes: for instance, technical assistance to increase the reliability
of commercial satellite launches could also help ballistic missile development.
Globalisation makes the national security strategy of restricting access to dual-
use information increasingly difficult to sustain because there are so many incentives
and opportunities to share powerful information with foreign business associates,





academic colleagues, fellow activists or partners in crime. It is wiser to work with,
rather than against, this trend by making the exchange of dual-use information
conditional on the acceptance of appropriate arrangements to document that it is
being used for agreed purposes.8
The design of verification arrangements will differ depending on issue area, both
in order to focus the most scrutiny on the most serious security concerns and in
order to leverage maximum verification benefit from information being gathered
or exchanged in that field for other purposes. In general, each advanced co-
operative security system would include:
• reporting and other disclosure requirements whereby participants would docu-
ment their own compliance with co-operative obligations;
• routine cross-checks whereby authorities would collect information to confirm
or question the accuracy and completeness of disclosed information; and
• increasingly intrusive investigative powers allowing authorities to request addi-
tional information, conduct inspections, and take other steps to clarify suspicious
situations and, if necessary, provide the evidence of non-compliance needed for
an effective response.
Relevant concepts, practices and technologies can be found not only in previous
arms control agreements but also in other types of international agreement, in
various national regulatory regimes, in voluntary transparency and review arrange-
ments, and even in surprising places, such as inventory tracking systems for global
business. One review of global governance across a wide range of issues identified
a diverse array of verification tools and some important general lessons, such as
the need for verification to determine not only whether a violation has occurred
but why it has happened, so that informed choices can be made to promote com-
pliance.9 The novel aspect of verification for advanced co-operative security lies
not in any individual component. Rather, it rests in the creative synthesis of diverse
sources of information, many of which exist now but are underutilised, for the
purpose of providing participants with a clearer picture of activity in realms of
behaviour that were previously shielded from outside scrutiny.
As other authors have noted, globalisation and the information revolution are
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civil society to be active in the verification process.10 Recent writing shows that
global civil society shares the interest of advanced co-operative security in setting
behavioural norms and promoting transparency. The decentralised nature of many
global security problems makes non-coercive ‘regulation by revelation’ attractive,
especially as governments, businesses and private-sector groups should be both
regulators and regulated—that is, be more transparent about their own operations
and use public information to pressure others to behave appropriately.11
Contrary to some writing about transparency, however, the advanced methods
of co-operative security approach does not assume that all compliance information
could come from open sources or that it should be made public. Once a clear
picture has been obtained of the types of information needed to verify compliance
with a particular set of co-operative obligations, one should first determine how
much of that information is already in the public domain or in other accessible
data sets. Then one needs to determine how much of the other necessary information
should be encouraged or required to be made public, and how much is truly sensi-
tive for national security or commercial reasons and thus needs to be kept within
the system under special access and use rules. The computer technology exists to
mine vast quantities of open-source data and to integrate compliance information
from diverse sources into very powerful controlled-access databases. The more
difficult challenge is deciding what needs to be known, who should know it and
how that knowledge should be used to enhance co-operation.
Participants in a co-operative security regime will be more forthcoming with infor-
mation about their activities if they are not worried about confusing regulations,
unachievable standards, false accusations or criminal penalties for unintentional
errors. If compliance concerns arise during the verification process, they should
be handled, at least initially, through co-operative mechanisms. These would include
procedures to clarify ambiguous rules and resolve disputes about the rules’ applica-
bility to specific cases. They could incorporate technical, financial and legal assistance
to increase capacity for compliance. They could involve a range of positive incentives
to encourage compliance. They would also include strategies to change how partici-
pants think about co-operation, such as providing more complete and accurate
information to influence cost–benefit calculations or promoting norms to alter
underlying values.12 These mechanisms would be a relatively constructive, low-





cost way to resolve compliance problems that arise from ignorance, incapacity or
inadvertence. If, however, the verification process yields evidence of deliberate and
egregious violations, then there would be a need to have more adversarial investi-
gation and enforcement tools available, either within the co-operative security system
itself or through another national or international body.
Advanced co-operative security in practice
The 2002 anthrax attacks in the United States raised a host of questions about
access to dangerous pathogens and revealed a remarkable lack of information and
oversight of research involving virulent disease agents in academia, in industry,
among defence contractors and in government national security laboratories.
Much of the ensuing debate has focused on finding the right balance between
science and security—trying to leave the ‘good guys’ alone as much as possible
while preventing the ‘bad guys’ from gaining access to dangerous pathogens or
learning from the open literature how to make deadly diseases.
Advanced co-operative security offers an alternative approach to promoting bene-
ficial uses of biotechnology while preventing its misapplication—one in which
systematic disclosure and independent peer review are used to make science and
security mutually supportive. This section previews the basic elements of the proto-
type Biological Research Security System () that is being developed as part of
the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program.13
A comprehensive research oversight system that covers both legitimate scientists
and potential miscreants is needed for several reasons. To begin with, the most
objective and effective way to draw proactive distinctions between the ‘good guys’
and the ‘bad guys’ is to define disclosure and review requirements for everybody
doing legitimate work with dangerous pathogens, so that anyone who refuses stands
out. Furthermore, the system needs to address not only the deliberate misuse of
biotechnology but also various ways in which legitimate science could cause inad-
vertent destruction. Lax safety and security standards could prove disastrous even
in a laboratory devoted solely to bio-defence or vaccine development.14 Cutting-
edge research could produce unexpectedly dangerous results.15 Knowledge gener-
ated by benign research could be used by someone else for hostile purposes.16 Finally,
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tralised solution that is primarily designed and implemented by a worldwide net-
work of legitimate scientists.
Many international agreements and domestic regulations cover some aspect of
work with dangerous pathogens, but few address basic research.17 The  prohibits
states parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or
retaining biological agents or toxins ‘of types and in quantities that have no justi-
fication for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’ but does not list
research among its prohibitions. Neither the  nor subsequent review confer-
ences have provided much guidance for differentiating between peaceful and
hostile purposes, and some people argue that almost any activity could be justified
in the name of ‘threat assessment’.18 During work on the  verification protocol
a partial, indirect attempt was made to define activities that should be the focus
of additional verification efforts by generating lists of dangerous agents, criteria
for relevant facilities and requirements for declaring particular kinds of work.
The logic behind constructive proposals was to concentrate on types and quantities
of agents and equipment that seemed most likely to be used by a state in an offen-
sive military programme. The politics of the protocol negotiations, however,
combined conflicting preferences for secrecy and security into a compromise draft
text in which the thresholds and exemptions of the transparency arrangements
were so important that the net effect of going only that far might well have been to
increase suspicions rather than to reduce them.19
Much attention is currently concentrated on strengthening national systems for
controlling dangerous pathogens as an alternative or a supplement to future inter-
national efforts. In the  a patchwork of regulations and recommendations have
some relevance for basic research with dangerous pathogens but focus primarily
on the later stages of testing, producing and packaging biotechnology products.
The three most relevant areas are probably new legislation mandating reports on
the possession of designated pathogens; bio-safety recommendations to promote
the safe handling of pathogens that pose varying degrees of risk; and review pro-
cedures for recombinant  (r) research at institutions that receive funding
for that purpose from the National Institutes of Health (). The new federal
legislation does not require any information about the research being done with
the designated pathogens. Bio-safety reviews and most r reviews are done at





the local (institutional) level with varying degrees of rigour. Much research with
dangerous pathogens could be done with no external reporting or review whatso-
ever, especially if it does not involve a listed pathogen or is conducted at an institution
that does not receive  funding. Concerns about what might be going on behind
closed laboratory doors are likely to grow as funding for bio-defence work expands,
more work is done on a classified basis, and pressures increase for the publication
of potentially dangerous research results to be restricted.
An advanced co-operative security approach to balancing the benefits and risks
of biotechnology research seeks to make science and security work together through
the twin mechanisms of systematic disclosure and independent peer review. One
can envisage the establishment of a  with objectives, standards and operational
procedures that are shared globally yet implemented largely on the local and national
levels. The fundamental objective would be to provide reassurance that legitimate
research involving dangerous pathogens was being done in such a way that its benefits
for global society outweighed the risks of deliberate misuse or inadvertent danger.
The system would be based on agreed standards for assessing the level of danger
posed by different lines of research and for assigning appropriate operational standards
for work at each danger level.
The  should be based on a definition of dangerous research that is under-
standable for both scientists and lay people and is flexible enough to match rapid
advances in biotechnology. The three features of a pathogen that are most relevant
are its transmissibility, its infectivity and its pathogenicity. In other words, to assess
the risk posed by research with a particular pathogen, one needs to know three
things about the organism that the researcher will start or end up with. Could it
spread easily from person to person or be widely disseminated in some other way?
How many of the people that it encounters will become sick? And how many sick
people will die? (Natural pathogens reflect evolutionary trade-offs along these
dimensions. For example, pathogens that kill their hosts too quickly have less oppor-
tunity to spread.) Smallpox is considered to be among the most dangerous pathogens
because it is moderately contagious, low-level exposure can lead to infection, and
30 per cent or more of infected individuals will die unless vaccinated before symptoms
appear.20 Smallpox that was genetically engineered to be more contagious or vaccine-
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One could define extremely dangerous research () loosely to cover work
with pathogens whose combined danger factors are comparable to or worse than
those associated with smallpox, the pathogen for which research is currently most
tightly controlled.21 Moderately dangerous research () would include work
with pathogens such as anthrax that could pose very serious public health problems
but do not have the same mass destruction potential as would be seen in a self-
sustaining epidemic of smallpox or highly virulent influenza. Potentially dangerous
research () would cover experiments that start with relatively benign pathogens
and involve techniques that might produce a more dangerous pathogen or provide
knowledge that could be applied to another, more dangerous pathogen with poten-
tially devastating results. One of the first tasks in creating the  would be to
decide whether these conceptual categories should be operationalised narrowly, to
minimise the amount of research subject to each level of oversight, or broadly, to
reduce the likelihood of dangerous research receiving inadequate supervision.
Each level of danger would have corresponding disclosure and review requirements.
Since , if mishandled, might have dire global consequences, the very small
amount of research that might be done in this realm should be subject to strict
international control. For example, scientists would need a special license to conduct
; they would be required to submit regular activity reports and to secure approval
from an international body of experts for each proposed  experiment, all of
which would be conducted only at approved facilities under international super-
vision; and the results of all experiments would be handled according to special
dissemination procedures. In terms of moderately dangerous research, internationally
agreed standards and procedures for licensing, routine reporting, research proposal
review and dissemination would be applied by national authorities with oversight
from the international agency. Most biological research would either be low-risk,
and thus could continue without new oversight requirements, or fall into the 
category, which would be subject to more systematic local oversight and indepen-
dent review with national oversight using world-class standards.
The  would include two different types of verification. Much of the reassurance
in the system would be a natural by-product of following the appropriate licensing,
reporting, review and publication procedures, all of which would be designed with
a presumption in favour of transparency or, if necessary, systematic disclosure of





sensitive information under agreed access and use conditions. There would need to
be additional means to ensure that information provided to the system was detailed,
accurate and complete enough to enable reliable judgements about the research
activities in question. Some of this could be done by relatively neutral, technical
methods, such as auditing annual reports for internal consistency, cross-checking
information provided by one laboratory with submissions from others with which
it interacted, or comparing research proposal review records with findings published
in academic journals and patent applications for biomedical products.
Some tough political choices will be unavoidable, though, especially for moderately
dangerous research involving information that is sensitive for reasons of national
security, proprietary interests or other intellectual property rights. The preferred
approach would be to require thorough reporting and review at the national level,
with the most sensitive details being kept confidential but made available on request
to the appropriate international authorities under agreed access and use rules. The
less willing laboratories and national authorities are to disclose sensitive information
through co-operative procedures, the more necessary it would be to resort to challenge
inspections and other adversarial forms of verification.
The underlying purpose of the  is to buttress the negative norm against the
destructive use of life science embodied not only by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
the , but also by the Hippocratic Oath and universal ideas of human decency.
However, the fact that the proposed system builds on specific positive, process-
oriented obligations has important implications for verification. To begin with,
it is easier to confirm a positive than to prove a negative. Moreover, the appropriate
standard for this verification system is not whether it can detect every significant
clandestine biological weapons-related activity; that standard is both too broad
for a research-focused system and impossible for any prevention-oriented approach
to meet. A more appropriate standard would ask whether the  verification
arrangements (a) do more good than harm—whether the benefits of increased
confidence that the power of biological research is not being misused outweigh
whatever inconvenience and intrusion occurs at each level of research; and (b) make
a net contribution to global security when combined with other national and inter-
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Conclusion
The pathogens application illustrates some of the ways in which security co-
operation and verification need to change to reflect the altered circumstances of
global security. In contrast to the Cold War, when threatening military capabilities
and arenas for security co-operation existed apart from most citizens’ normal
existence, many new threats and the opportunities for co-operation are now spread
throughout routine scientific, economic and social interactions. Biotechnology
research is a diffuse, knowledge-driven, collaborative activity of increasing impor-
tance to the health and economic welfare of every country in the world. Any security
strategy that ignores these fundamental facts is bound to fail. Any approach that
recognises new types of threats but responds using traditional national security
and law enforcement tools will impose unnecessarily high costs—including increased
suspicion, threat assessment activities that erode constraints on the destructive uses
of biotechnology, draconian prohibitions on experimentation or publication that
impede scientific advance, and infringements on civil liberties—all for little or no
net gain to world security.
Working out the details of a Biological Research Security System, or any other
advanced co-operative security solution for comparable problems in other fields,
will require a tremendous amount of creative thinking by scientists, arms control
experts, information technology specialists, lawyers and industry representatives
from around the world. This is a long-term vision; no one expects a full-blown
version of this system to be in place at any time soon. But as the problem becomes
more urgent the number of people working on incremental improvements to
existing national and international arrangements will grow exponentially. Thinking
now about where we might want to be headed can make the difference between
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counterproductive confusion and slow, steady progress in the right direction.
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